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PUTTING GOD ON TRIAL: The Biblical Book of Job. 5. A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS |
Myth
is a fictional account of the origin of certain ideas, individuals or
institutions. The actors and
actions that drive the plot illustrate rather than demonstrate certain
truths about the human condition.
The actors and actions may incorporate certain historical details,
but those details are fictionalized and embellished to draw out certain
universal truths. Myth often
involves stories about creation since the beginning of things is an
appropriate time to discuss the “efficient cause” of things. However, it can involve stories
about the apocalypse since the end of things is an appropriate time to
discuss the “final cause” of things.
Such stories speculate about the potentialities and actualities
implicit in things. The
reason myth involves both creation and apocalypse is that for many
mythmakers the end is implicit in the
beginning.
The Book of Job is a
myth. The inverted syntax of
the opening which is unique to parables suggests the book itself should be
read as inspired fiction. The
exclusive use of poetry rather than prose in the three cycles of speeches
suggests any historical core has been thoroughly ficitionalized. The literary form of that fiction
is myth because the book deals with the origin of evil and the end of that
evil. (1) The characters of God, Satan and Job as
presented in the book merely dramatize certain aspects of the efficient
cause of evil in the world.
God created a world of undeserved and unremitted suffering in order
to create the highest form of love possible: a completely selfless love of
men and women for God. As a
perfect being, God would have made this decision to create a particular
type of world in eternity, not in time. God’s wager with Satan at a
particular point in time never happened. It is merely a dramatic way of
exploring the moral dimensions of God’s decision to create a less than
perfect world and the human horror at such a decision. Job is a perfect human being. His early life in (2) Moreover, the characters of Job and Leviathan
as presented in the later parts of the book merely dramatize certain
aspects of the final cause of evil in the world.
(a) Job represents the potential for moral
integrity all human beings possess.
His Oath of Innocence and his nuanced submission are powerful
expressions of how human beings should respond to the evil in the world
around them. They should
challenge God. Human beings
have a right to know the reason for evil in the world. But they should not prematurely
condemn God.
(b) Leviathan is the creation of Ancient Near
Eastern mythologies, with important ties to both creation and
apocalypse. Leviathan as such
never existed. Leviathan is
the poetic embodiment of the evil that is all the death, disease and
disability in this world. Its
ties to creation draw out the “efficient cause” of all things. And its ties to apocalypse draw
out the “final cause” of all things.
In the author’s hands, Leviathan is merely a moral metaphor for
God’s creation, control, destruction and justification of evil. And the metaphor itself suggests
an apocalyptic resolution to the moral question. Evil is not God’s final purpose in
the creation of the world.
The time will come when Leviathan is drawn from the waters and
served up as the main course at the Messianic banquet at the end of human
history. Such a banquet is a
fictional description of the meaning of the resurrection and Final
Judgment. It will not occur
in precisely that way. But it
will be a time when God as the Messiah will declare and justify his final
purpose in the creation and control of evil. The execution and explanation of
that purpose could be the finest demonstration of God’s power: the power
to bring good out of evil.
As it stands, The Book of Job is merely myth
building on myth, but it is artfully
done.
As a literary device, myth has truth value. Myth is not deceit. Deceit is the intentional
communication of known error.
Truthfulness is the intentional communication of a thought that
accurately corresponds with reality.
Myth advances certain truth claims about the divine and the
human. But it advances those
claims on an existential level, not a historical level. The images in the myth refer to
things beyond themselves.
Only the most ignorant of interpreters would confuse the image with
its reference. When they do
so, they commit the logical fallacy of confusing a metaphor with a
truth. The truth of history
is what actually happened.
The truth of myth is what actually describes the human condition,
either what it is or what it could be.
The Book of Job presents
a number of truth claims that describe the human condition, either as it
is or as it could be. It is
worth considering those claims in some detail.
1.
Is
morality dependant on special revelation?
Is morality dependant on special revelation?
No.
The Book of Job asserts
that is the case. Job is not
an Israelite. Job does not
live in the
And there appear to be good reasons why that might be
so.
Human nature provides a sufficient basis for establishing
morality. Goodness is the
fulfillment of the natural needs or desires that define human nature. Evil is that which frustrates that
fulfillment.
(1) The basic ethical duty that one “ought to desire”
“what is really good” is a type of self-evident truth known as a
commensurate universal.[1] The
good is the desirable and the desirable is the good. The terms “desire” and “goodness”
are such basic or “universal” terms that cannot be defined apart from each
other. They can only be
defined in terms of or “commensurate” with each other.
(a) “Desire” is the dispositional potential for
“goodness”.
(b) “Goodness” is the actualization of
“desire”.
(c) “Ought” is the “rational necessity” or
“practical reasonableness” of desiring what is “really good” as opposed to
what is merely “apparently good”.
It is unthinkable that one ought to desire what is really bad or that one ought not to desire what is “really
good”. (2) These needs that define human nature are naturally
knowable by all rational persons who have reached the age of moral
accountability. The criteria
by which they are known: universality, eradicability and irresistibility
are objective.[2] The
real goods that fulfill those needs are equally knowable.
(3) The process by which moral rules are derived is
logically valid. Moral
conclusions can be validly drawn from a major premise containing a
statement of value and a minor premise containing statements of fact. No violation of the naturalistic
fallacy is present in such deductions or derivations.[3]
Human nature is not independent of God. Human beings are contingent not
necessary beings. The fact
that they exist provides strong evidence that a necessary being God
exists. The existence of God
can be rationally established by the cosmological argument which begins
with the contingency of human beings and the perfections within them and
arrives at the conclusion of an all-powerful, all-present, all-knowing,
and all-good being, God.
Aquinas’s five ways is the classic expression of that
argument.[4]
Human beings are the creation of
God.
To say that morality is independent of special revelation is not to
say that morality is independent of God. God has made human nature what it
is and given human beings the necessary tools to derive a natural
knowledge of good and evil.
That natural knowledge has been termed God’s general revelation in
nature as opposed to his special revelation in a religious text or
tradition.
And God has given all human beings sufficient common grace to keep
them sinless, if they choose to act on that natural knowledge.
2. Must God create the best?
Must God create the best of all possible worlds?
No.
The Book of Job asserts
that is the case.
God
is the author of evil in the world.
The evil is both natural and moral. God is causally responsible for
the existence of that evil.
His decision may or may not be blameworthy depending of the
legitimacy of God’s reason in sending the evil. While God may use natural or
supernatural intermediaries, such intermediaries are secondary
instrumental causes. He is
the principal; they are his agents.
They have no agency or power to act without his permission and
direction. This second truth
claim is advanced through Satan’s challenge to God to do evil (Job
1:9-11), God’s authorization of a first set of evils (Job 1:12), Satan’s
infliction of that evil on God’s order (Job 1:12-19), God’s confession
that he has done evil without any cause in Job (Job 2:3), God’s
authorization of a second evil (Job 2:4-6), Satan’s infliction of that
evil at God’s command (Job 2:7), Job’s confession that God has done evil.
(Job
And
there appear to be good reasons why that might be
so.
(1) First, the best of all
possible worlds may not be possible.
God cannot create what is impossible to create. The “best of all possible worlds”
describes a world of goodness only, with no evil or imperfection in
it. The idea of such a
perfect world is probably incoherent. Why? One can easily imagine two or more
finite worlds that are equally good.
The goodness is expressed in different ways in each world. While there would be no evil in
any of those worlds, it would be impossible to say one is better than
another. In such a situation,
there is no “best”. All are
equally good. Before God can
be faulted for creating a world where there is evil, it has been shown
there is one and only one perfect world that God should have created. So far, philosophers have not done
so.[5]
(2) Second, God would not be unjust in creating a world with some
evil in it. He would not be
wronging anyone in doing so.
He would not be depriving them of anything to which they had a
right. (a) God would not be wronging those persons who would
have existed in a perfect world without evil, but who do not exist now
because God has chosen to create a world with evil in it. Such persons never came into
existence. They never had any
right to existence. God was
never under any obligation to bring them into existence. They do not exist now. So if they do not exist, then God
has not wronged them by choosing not to create them.[6]
(b) God would not be wronging those persons who do exist
in a world with evil. Such
persons would not have existed in a world of perfect goodness. They have imperfections and would
not have existed in such a perfect world. But the lives they have in a less
than perfect world are not so miserable on the whole that it would have
been better if they never had existed. God does not wrong anyone who claims that they were not created in
a perfect world, because their complaint is unreasonable. They would
not have existed in such a world. And it is better that they exist
in some world than not exist in the perfect world.[7] .
(3) Third, God would not be unloving in creating a world with some
evil in it.
God is not only just, but loving. An important part of love is
grace.
God loves others without worrying about whether or not they are
worthy of his love. Imperfect persons living in an
imperfect world are intrinsically less valuable than perfect persons
living in a perfect world. They have evil and imperfection in
their character and in their lives. But God does not care. God sees what
is valuable in every person. He does not worry about whether he
could have found someone else more valuable somewhere else. This is the
virtue of grace. It is something God has. And it is
something others should have. In creating an imperfect world, God
creates imperfect persons who are not as worthy of his love as those who
would have existed in a perfect world. This choice is explainable and
justifiable in terms of the particular type of love known as grace, which
is a virtue rather than a defect in character.[8] 3. Does God act for a reason?
Does God act for reason when he creates the world? Yes.
The Book of
Job asserts that is the case. God
acts for a reason in creating that evil. That reason is not punishment or
character development. That reason is creation of a certain
type of relationship between God and humanity. Evil is
morally necessary to allow selfishness and selfless love to develop
separately so that men and women can selflessly love God. If human
beings know with certainty that God rewards those who love him, then human
beings might be tempted to use God for their own ends. Selfishness
corrupts selfless love. This third truth claim is advanced
through declarations by the author and by God of Job’s virtual sinlessness
(Job 1:1; 1:8; 2:3), Satan’s first speech in heaven (Job 1:9-11) and God’s
acceptance of the terms of the test proposed. (Job 1:12: 2:6)
All persons act for a reason. That reason is goodness. The good is
the desirable and the desirable is the good. The good is
the object of our desires. It is self-evidently true that all
persons desire the good. At the moment of choice, all persons
choose what appears good to them, whether or not it actually is really
good for them.
No person chooses what appears harmful or injurious to them. This remains
the case even in the most apparently destructive of all acts,
suicide.
To a suicidal person, death appears good, even though it may not
really be good. All action is intentional and
purposeful.
The purpose is the achievement of a particular good, real or
apparent.
God is a person, by definition. If God chooses to create a particular
world, then he does so with a reason in mind. That reason
is purposeful and designed to achieve a particular good.
4. Do human beings have a need to know the reason for
evil?
Do human beings have a need to know the reason for evil in the
world?
Yes.
The Book of
Job asserts that is the case. Human beings
have a need to know the reason why God has created a world of
undeserved and unremitted suffering. And a religious person, Job desires to
know why God has apparently contradicted himself by sending evil into the
world.
This fourth truth claim is advanced through all Job’s speeches in
the first (Job 3:1-3:26; 6:1-7:21; 9:1-9:35), second (Job 12:1-14:22;
16:1-17:14; 19:1-19:29) and third (Job 21:1-21:34; 23:1-24:25; 26:1-31:4)
cycles of speeches and through God’s judgment on Job’s three friends (Job
42:7).
And there appear to be good reasons why that might be so.
The need to know the truth of why there is evil in
the world is an expression of a human being’s basic desire to know. The desire to
know the truth is a natural desire rooted in human nature. It is
universal in the sense all human beings have it. It is
eradicable in the sense that all persons have it at all points in their
lives.
It is irresistible in the sense that this desire is constantly
seeking fulfillment. This particular need is very important,
because the answer to that question is central to the meaning of life
itself.
5. Do human beings have a right to know?
Do human beings have right to know that reason for evil in the
world?
Yes.
The Book of
Job asserts that is the case. Human beings
haves a moral right to know the reason why God has created a world
of undeserved and unremitted suffering. That fifth truth claim is advanced
through Job’s raising of legal Oath of Innocence. (Job 27:1-31:4) That moral
claim is dramatized as a legal claim.
And there appear to be good reasons why that might be so.
Moral rights are a reflection of natural needs. Natural needs
are always good. There is no such thing as a wrong
need.
The very concept of a wrong natural need is incoherent. A right is a
justified moral claim. The justification is supplied by the
natural needs themselves. The justification is
self-evidence.
It is self-evidently true that there are no wrong natural
needs.[9] Once it is
established that there is a natural need to know the reason why there is
evil in the world, there is a natural moral right to that knowledge. 6. Does God have a duty to give the answer?
Does God have a duty to give human beings the answer to why there
is evil in the world? Yes and no. Yes, God must
provide an explanation for evil in the world. No, God need
not provide that answer here and now.
The
Book of Job asserts that is the case. God has a moral duty to provide a necessary and
sufficient reason why he has created a world of undeserved and unremitted
suffering.
That sixth truth claim is advanced through God being the defendant
in Job’s legal Oath of Innocence. (Job 27:2-6; 31:35-37) That moral
duty is dramatized as a legal duty to respond or suffer the condemnation
that can follow summary default judgment.
And there appear to be good reasons why that might be
so.
(1) Yes, God has a duty to give the answer. That duty is
rooted in the goodness of God. God has created human beings with
certain natural needs, including the need for truth. God has to
provide a reasonable possibility that those needs can be fulfilled for it
is self-evidently true that “ought implies can”. Otherwise, God is
contradicting himself. God does not have any obligations to
human beings prior to their creation. But once God creates humankind with
certain needs, God acquires certain duties of care. They are
duties he owes to himself and to men and women.
(2) No, God does not have the duty to give the answer right
now.
That is because the right to know is not an inalienable and
indefeasible right. A right is inalienable or indefeasible
if it cannot be “given up”, “taken away”, “deferred” or “overridden”,
without a moral wrong being committed. Very few rights are inalienable
and indefeasible in that sense. There are perhaps only three such
rights: the rights to “life, liberty[10] and the
pursuit of happiness.” Those three rights can never be given
up, taken away, deferred or overridden, without human nature itself being
destroyed.
The right to know the truth can be overridden or deferred in
certain circumstances. Such circumstances exist where the
disclosure of the truth would interfere with the pursuit or possession of
a more important good. Selfless love is posited as such a real
good.
Time is required for the development of that good. Any premature
disclosure of that truth is overridden by that higher good. The ultimate
disclosure of that truth is deferred to the time at which that good is
complete.
Truth is never denied as being a real good. If truth were
not regarded as a good, then that denial would constitute a moral
wrong.
It is just that the timing of the disclosure of the truth has some
flexibility to it. Since selfless love is posited as a
real good justifying the deferral of the truth behind evil in the world
for an entire human life, the appropriate time for that disclosure is the
moment of death, or a short time thereafter in a resurrection and a Final
Judgment on the life one has lived. 7. Is selfless love a real good?
Is selfless love a real good? Yes.
The Book of
Job asserts that is the case. It is God’s
reason for creating this type of world. This seventh truth is advanced through
Satan’s challenge and God’s acceptance of the challenge. (Job 1:9-12;
2:6)
And there appear to be good reasons why that might be so.
Human beings have a natural desire to love and be loved. That desire
is rooted in human nature. It is universal in the sense all human
beings have it.
It is eradicable in the sense that all persons have it at all
points in their lives. It is irresistible in the sense that
this desire is constantly seeking fulfillment. This
particular need is very important, because love is perhaps the highest
good and central to the meaning of life itself. Selfless love
is the highest expression of love.
8. Is evil necessary to achieve that good?
Is evil necessary to achieve that good? Yes, at least
some evil is necessary.
The Book of
Job asserts that is the case. God’s
decision to create a world of undeserved and unremitted suffering is
rooted in the need to separate righteousness from reward. This eighth
truth claim is advanced through Satan’s challenge to Job and God’s
acceptance of the challenge. (Job 1:9-12; 2:6)
And there appear to be good reasons why that might be
so.
Selfishness can corrupt selfless love. Any necessary
connection between reward and righteousness can seriously corrupt selfless
love.
Evil is necessary to break any necessary connection between
righteousness and reward. The real question is how much and what
type of evil is necessary to sever the bond so completely that human
beings act as the connection never existed. 9. Is the evil in the world sufficient to achieve
that good?
Is the quantity and quality of evil in this world
sufficient to achieve that good? Yes, at least probably so.
The Book of Job takes that nuanced approach. Only God has
the omniscience to give a definitive answer. Job adjourns
his Oath of Innocence to the Day of the Final Judgment and awaits that
final answer.
This ninth truth claim is advanced through Job’s
allusion to a Redeemer who stands up in court at the Final Judgment to
plead his cause (Job 19:25-27), through the allusion to the apocalyptic
destruction of Leviathan at the Messianic banquet with its explanation of
all things (Job 41:6; Isaiah 25:6-9; 27:1; 29:18-21) and through Job’s
allusion to Abraham in his adjournment of his Oath of Innocence. (Job
42:6)
And there appear to be good reasons why that might be so.
Those reasons involve a consideration of the “evidential argument
from evil”.
The mere existence of evil is not the issue. All scholars
agree that the “logical argument from evil” fails to disprove the
existence of God as a God of goodness. The two propositions (a) "God exists
and is all-powerful, all-present, all-knowing and all-good" and (b) "evil
exists" are not logically incompatible.[11]
The moral skeptic is the one who would prematurely blame and
condemn God for sending gratuitous evil into the world. The moral
skeptic would format the evidential argument from evil in the following
way: (1) Major premise (p): "There exists instances of
intense suffering which an all-powerful, all-present, all-knowing and
all-good being could have prevented without thereby preventing the
occurrence of any greater good." (2) Minor premise (q): "An all-powerful, all-present,
all-knowing and all-good being prevents the occurrence of any evil that is
not logically necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of a good which
outweighs it." (3)
Conclusion (r): "Therefore, an all-powerful, all-present, all-knowing and
all-good being does not exist."[12]
The moral skeptic has two difficulties here.
The first difficulty is establishing the truth of the first
premise. It almost requires omniscience to do it. In the case
at hand in The
Book of Job, the truth of that first premise is known by God and God
alone.
It is only an omniscient God that can give that answer. It is the
message of The
Book of Job that God is under a moral duty, dramatized as a legal
duty, to give that answer and he will give it at the Final Judgment. It would be
then that God would present a rigorous philosophical demonstration of his
purpose in the creation and use of evil. Traditional religious thinking asserts
that God will give all human beings at that time a supernatural grace that
expands their minds to understand the intricacies of things that would
have otherwise eluded them. This supernatural grace is part and
parcel of “Beatific Vision”. Human beings will be elevated beyond
their created status to understand all things through the divine mind,
which is identical with the divine essence. They will remain human beings, but
possess certain supernatural graces such as an expanded mind. It is at such
a time that God would be able to present a philosophical demonstration of
the truth or falsity of the skeptics’ first premise and human beings would
be able to understand it. In our world, it is only possible to
say that such an answer could be forthcoming, because it could exist. But
omniscience would be required to present that answer and to understand
it. In
the meantime, it would be a sin of presumption to presume no such answer
could be forthcoming.
The second difficulty is the logic or validity of the argument
itself.
The evidential argument from evil can be turned on its head.
The moral skeptic’s form of the evidential argument from evil is
“If (p) and (q), then (r)”. But the logic of the argument is
reversible, as the great 20th century
philosopher G.E. Moore noted. The evidential argument from evil is
equally valid if presented in a different form: “If (not r) and (q), then
(not p)”.
This is the so-called “G.E. Moore shift.”[13] Again we are
talking about the validity of the argument, not the truth of the
argument.
The moral skeptic now has a Trojan horse on his or her hands.
A theist such as Job could reformat the argument in a way that
strongly suggests the existence of an answer. (1) Major premise (not r): "An all-powerful,
all-present, all-knowing and all-good being does exist." (2) Minor premise (q): "An all-powerful, all-present,
all-knowing and all-good being prevents the occurrence of any evil that is
not logically necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of a good which
outweighs it." (3)
Conclusion (not p): "There do not exist instances of intense suffering
which an all-powerful, all-present, all-knowing and all-good being could
have prevented without thereby preventing the occurrence of any greater
good."[14]
The $64,000 question is a simple one. Is the
evidence stronger for the moral skeptic’s first premise: "there exists
instances of intense suffering which an all-powerful, all-present,
all-knowing and all-good being could have prevented without thereby
preventing the occurrence of any greater good"? Or is the
evidence stronger for the theist's first premise "an all-powerful,
all-present, all-knowing and all-good being does exist"?
At first glance, the scales tip in favor of the theist. The moral
skeptic has a real difficulty establishing the truth of his first
premise.
He or she may have their suspicions but they require something near
omniscience to establish the truth of his first premise. Their task is
especially difficult with the real good selfless love presented in The Book of
Job.
That love requires a massive quantity of undeserved evil that
brings the very existence of God into serious question so that the bond
between righteousness and reward can be completely severed. The theist
has much less difficulty with his first premise. The
cosmological argument from Aquinas presents very strong evidence for the
existence of a necessary being with all the perfections of being,
including intellect and goodness.[15] It does
not require anything near omniscience to establish the theist’s first
premise.
Thus, there appear to be good reasons to believe God had a special
good in mind in creating the world and the evil in the world is necessary
and sufficient to bring about that real good. The message
of The Book of
Job is that the one true god, Yahweh, a perfect being, has that
answer, will ultimately present it and will ultimately demonstrate its
truth. 10. Is there a Final Judgment?
Is there a Final Judgment? Yes.
The
Book of Job asserts that is the case. The moral question that only God can
answer can only be fully answered on the Day of the Final Judgment. This final
truth claim is advanced through Job’s allusion to a Redeemer who stands up
in court at the Final Judgment to plead his cause (Job 19:25-27), through
the allusion to the apocalyptic destruction of Leviathan at the Messianic
banquet with its explanation of all things (Job 41:6; Isaiah 25:6-9; 27:1;
29:18-21) and through Job’s allusion to Abraham in his adjournment of his
Oath of Innocence. (Job 42:6)
And there appear to be good reasons why that might be so.
God created men and women to lead a good life and the nature of the
good life suggests the possibility of an afterlife. The good life
is a final end that is normative, not terminal. It cannot be
said at any point in time that a person has lived a good life when life
itself is not over. The good in life is the good life as a
whole.
That whole good is never achieved at any moment in time. That’s what
meant by saying the final end is not terminal. It is always in the process
of becoming.
The only terminus is death. Thus any assessment as to whether a
person has lived a good life is an assessment that can only be made at the
end of life itself. Only then is a final judgment possible
on the goodness of life. God created men and women to lead a
good life and presumably God intends an examination of his work. The
appropriate time for that assessment is the moment of death or shortly
thereafter.
This does not mean an afterlife is logically necessary. It merely
means that an afterlife may be an appropriate time for God to pass
judgment of the fruits of his labor.
God created men and women with certain unlimited desires, the
fulfillment of which lies beyond this life. The desire for truth and the desire for
God are by their very natures unlimited. The existence of such natural needs
strongly suggests the existence of real goods that satisfy those
needs.
The God that created the one provides the other. The one
implies the other. If that were not the case, then God
would contradict himself for it is self-evidently true that “ought”
implies “can”.
The desire for truth and the desire for God can only be completely
satisfied in an afterlife. Again, this does not mean an afterlife
is logically necessary. It merely means that there exists in
human nature a good reason to posit the existence of such an
afterlife. If such an afterlife exists, then that would be a highly appropriate time for God to give the answer to the question why is there evil in the world. It is contemporaneous with an assessment of human life and consistent with humanity’s unlimited natural desire to know the truth and to know God. [1] In understanding the nature of a commensurate universal, the following extract from Mortimer J. Adler’s The Time of Our Lives (Holt, Rinehart, Winston, New York, 1970) pp. 86-89 is particularly instructive. “It is
necessary to correct this misunderstanding in order to avoid the erroneous
conclusions that Let anyone attempt to define the meaning of ‘good’ by using the term ‘X’ as the defining property, and let ‘X’ stand either for something observable or something merely thinkable. It makes no difference to the argument which it is. The definition of good would then take the form ‘whatever is good is X.’ In Moore’s view, it would also be true that whatever is X is good, because in his view of definition, the good and X are identical. Now, says
Earlier philosophers…knew on other and better grounds that the good is indefinable; they did not need this argument to discover it. They knew that no all terms can be defined, and that certain primitive terms transcend the categories which make definition possible. Terms of this sort are indefinable. Among them are such basic philosophical terms as being and non-being, one and many, same and other. These terms are predicable of any subject, and as predicable of any subject, they are predicated in an analogical, not a univocal, sense; any terms that is thus predicable must be indefinable. Earlier philosophers, however, did not let the matter rest there. They recognized that a term that was indefinable was not, therefore, unintelligible or less intelligible than terms that can be defined. On the contrary, the indefinables are, of all terms, the most intelligible, even though we cannot state their meanings in definitions. How, then, can we state their meanings? The ancient answer to this question is” in axioms or self-evident propositions that were called ‘common notions’ because they do not belong to any particular discipline, propositions that Aristotle spoke of as correlating ‘commensurate universals’ because their constituent terms are of equal scope as universal predicates. Such equivalence makes these propositions convertible. One example of
this very special type of proposition is My reason for this little excursion into ancient and medieval logic is to call attention to the fact that when a twentieth-century philosopher like Moore refers to analytic propositions, he does not have in mind what philosophers prior to the seventeenth or eighteenth century would have called axioms or propositions per se nota, but only that conception of analytical or tautological propositions which he inherits from Locke and Kant. In Book IV of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke discusses ‘trifling’ or ‘uninstructive’ propositions, and mentions two main types: (i) simple identities, such as ‘a law is a law.’ Or ‘right is right and wrong is wrong’; and (ii) propositions in which the predicate is contained in the meaning of the subject as that is defined; for example, ‘Lead is a metal’ or ‘Gold is fusible’. It is the second type of trifling proposition that Kant calls ‘analytic’ and contrasts with synthetic propositions in which the predicate lies entirely outside the meaning of the subject as defined. Later writers return to Locke’s broader formulation and include statements of identity in the class of analytic propositions. It is this sense of ‘analytic’ that most twentieth-century philosophers employ when they regard self-evident or necessary truths as nothing but tautologies. That is clearly what Moore has in mind when he thinks that if there were a definition of good, it would produce an analytic proposition (in his view, a statement of simple identity) that would preclude any further question. But the proposition about wholes and parts is neither analytic in this sense nor synthetic. Yet it is clearly a self-evident and necessary truth, and it is instructive, not trifling or tautologicial. When we understand its truth, no open questions of fact remain. We cannot ask, ‘Is it really true that this part is less than the whole to which it belongs?’ or ‘Is this whole greater than any one of its parts?’ Now let us apply this elementary logic to the problem of the meaning of ‘good’ as an indefinable term. Its commensurate universal is expressed by the terms ‘desire’- or any of the synonyms for this word, such as ‘appetite,’ ‘yearning,’ ‘seeking,’ ‘aiming at,’ ‘tending toward,’ and so on. The correlation of these commensurate universals is stated by such terms as ‘satisfies’ and ‘aims at’; thus we can say, ‘The good is that which satisfies desire,’ and ‘Desire is that which aims at the good.’ Here the correlating terms ‘satisfies’ and ‘aims at’ function exactly as the correlating terms ‘greater than’ or ‘less than’ in the case of whole or part. The
self-evident propositions or axioms which correlate the good and desire
not only show that good and desire, like whole and part, are primitive and
indefinable terms; the axioms also explicate their meaning of these terms.
We understanding the meaning of ‘good’ and ‘desire’ in the same way that
we understand ‘whole’ and ‘part.’ Hence, when we say of any particular
whatsoever that it is good, we cannot then ask, ‘Is it in fact an object
of desire,’ any more than we can ask of any particular that we say is a
part, ‘Is it in fact less than the whole to which it belongs?’ When the
meaning of ‘good’ is thus understood without the term being defined,
[2] Fagothey, A., Right and Reason: Ethics in Theory and Practice
(The C.V. Mosby Company, St.Louis, 1959) p. 55. [3] Adler, M.J.,
The Time of
Our Lives: The Ethics of Common Sense (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New
York, 1970) pp. 94-97.; --------. Ten Philosophical
Mistakes (Collier Books, New York, 1985) pp.117-118,125-126; --------, Six Great Ideas:
Truth, Goodness and Beauty- Ideas We Judge By, Liberty, Equality, Justice-
Ideas We Act On (Collier Books, New York, 1981) p.81. [4] Aquinas, |